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REMOVAL OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS FROM FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION TO A TRADE COURT: A 
REPLY TO MR. KINTNER 
Raoul Berger* 
N OT long ago, Attorney General Rogers stated that, "The entire field of administrative law and of Government regulation 
may require a searching re-examination of some of the premises on 
which we have based our conclusions."1 What lifts this utterance 
to the level of "man bites dog" is that the Attorney General almost 
alone among federal administrators does not insist that the admin-
istrative process, in major outline, is forever frozen. The orthodox 
administrative view is exemplified by Mr. Earl W. Kintner's (for-
merly General Counsel and now Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission) numerous strictures upon the American Bar Associa-
tion proposal that the judicial functions of the Federal Trade Com-
mission be transferred to a Trade Court. To his alarmed gaze, 
this "caps" "The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process."2 
The ABA proposal grew out of a "searching re-examination," 
earlier undertaken by the Hoover Commission.3 "Without 
doubt," said Professor Jaffe in 1956, "the most acute problem of 
our administrative system is created by the so-called combination 
• Member, Illinois and District of Columbia bars; chairman of the ABA Special 
Committee on Special Courts. - Ed. 
1 Speech at the 25th anniversary banquet of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 1959, reported in the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1959. Mr. 
Kintner supplies for Dean Landis' "description of the current crisis" the label "The Crisis 
of Re-evaluation." Kintner, Federal Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties, 
Statement Before Federal Bar Association, Chicago, Sept. 16, 1960, p. 4 (hereinafter cited 
Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law). 
2 Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply To Mr. Hec-
tor, 69 YALE L.J. 965, 966 (1960) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Current Ordeal.) The pro-
posal for an Article III court is now embodied in S. 1275, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. For details, 
see Kintner, The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of Some Possible Defects, 44 
A.B.A.J. 441 (1958) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Trade Court Proposal). For additional 
criticisms, see Kintner, The Trade Court, the ABA, the Lawyer and the Public Interest, 
Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C., April 4-5, 1957, p. 72 
(hereinafter cited Kintner, Trade Court and ABA); Kintner, A Government Lawyer Com-
ments on the Davis Treatise, 43 MINN. L. REv. 620, 629 (1959) (hereinafter cited Kintner 
on Davis); Hearings Before Harris Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, House Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Nov. 18, 1958, p. 43 (herein-
after cited Harris Hearings). 
3 Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
(1955). 
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of prosecuting and adjudicating functions within one agency."4 It 
remains disquieting that the prosecutor who files a charge of law 
violation should be permitted to adjudicate the charge}' 
Not content with challenging the validity of the arguments in 
favor of the ABA proposal, Mr. Kintner impugns the motives of 
its architects, charging that the Trade Court advocates "would 
destroy the Federal Trade Commission and possibly scuttle the 
entire administrative process .... " 6 He views this as part of what 
he terms the "New Criticism," i.e., those who were opposed to 
governmental regulation, having lost the "battle," shift their 
ground to "reforms" that "would abolish regulation."7 For this, 
Mr. Kintner cites Justice Jackson, then Solicitor General: 
"Those who dislike such activities of the Government as reg-
ulation of the utility holding companies, of labor relations, or 
of the marketing of securities, rightly conceive that if they can 
destroy the administrative tribunal which enforces regulation, 
they would destroy the whole plan of regulation itself.''8 
4 Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1278 (1955) hereinafter 
cited Jaffe, Basic Issues). It needs remembering that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who 
created the bulk of the administrative agencies, said in 1937: "There is a conflict of prin• 
ciple involved in their make-up and functions .••• They are vested with duties of admin• 
istration • • • and at the same time they are given important judicial work. • • • The 
evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious and far-reaching. • • • 
Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating 
and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate 
private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these subversive 
influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors 
and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence 
in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the 
suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in 
the role of prosecutor, presented to itself." Quoted, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
206 (1941). 
For a recent clinical report to the same effect, see Hector, Problems of the CAB and 
the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960) (hereinafter cited Hector 
Memorandum). 
5 Recently the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, in Report No. 2031, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess., June 29, 1960 (hereinafter cited Veterans Affairs Report), noting (at p. 2) that 
Veterans Affairs "in all instances judges the claim which it is also defending itself against," 
recommended establishment of a Court of Veterans Appeals, saying (at p. 5), "the impor-
tance of maintaining tribunals for the impartial adjudication of the rights of citizens 
cannot be too strongly emphasized .•.• " 
6 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81. He has expressed the belief that 
"dismantling the administrative process •.• by removing the quasi-judicial functions from 
the administrative agencies across the board •.. really is the intention of those proposals 
emanating from the American Bar Association •.• .'' Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 
43. (Emphasis added.) He asks the rhetorical question, "Is this trade proposal merely an 
opening wedge in a campaign for ultimate destruction of the entire administrative process?" 
Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 95. (Emphasis added.) Such remarks 
recall Communist rejection of "deviationism" from the "party line" as heretical. 
7 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 967, 965. 
8 Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 629 (emphasis added), quoting Jackson, The Ad-
ministrative Process, 5 J. Soc. PHIL. 143, 146-47 (1940). Referring to the ABA proposal, 
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Undoubtedly Jackson's remarks had considerable force in 1940, 
the time of their utterance. It cannot be gainsaid that an im-
portant segment of the ABA was opposed to much of the New 
Deal's socio-economic program,9 and to its enforcement by an 
"alphabet soup" of new agencies. But while the ABA "had en-
gaged originally in a somewhat drastic attack on the administrative 
process as a whole, ... it, along with the New Dealers,10 learned a 
great deal from the long battle for the AP A."11 It would be an 
impractical if not a foolhardy lawyer who would today seek, for 
example, repeal of the National Labor Relations Act, the Securities 
Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Faith in the 
permanence of these New Deal innovations is nourished by the 
militant zeal with which Republicans, such as Mr. Kintner, are 
now crusading to safeguard the once suspect New Deal agencies 
from the touch of desecrating hands. 
he goes on to say that it has been demonstrated that "there is a close relationship between 
Mr. Justice Jackson's analysis in 1940 [Jackson, J., took his seat on October 6, 1941] and 
the American Bar Association action in 1956 with the resulting trade court bill in the 
present Congress •••. The trade court bill, if adopted, might very well aid, as Mr. Justice 
Jackson suggested, in destroying effective trade regulation." Id. at 630. 
o "The tremendous proliferation of administrative power in the 1920's, reaching its 
zenith in the first few years of the New Deal, alarmed the lawyer community. Basically, 
no doubt, it was the substance of the granted powers with their threat to the status quo 
which was disturbing." Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1273. 
10 "[M]any who in the mid-thirties were cheering the newly created agencies of the 
New Deal .•. believed that some inner current ineluctably made the administrative agency 
an instrument of social and economic progressivism ...• " 
"By and large the liberals believed that administrators could be relied upon for wise 
and just decisions, and that, as a corollary they should as far as possible be free from 
judicial supervisfon that might rigidify administrative procedures or supplant the informed 
administrative conclusions." GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REs'rn.AINT 
5, 8 (1956). 
After 1946, "within the academic groves could be heard mutterings that perhaps the 
courts were abdicating their responsibilities, and should stand readier than in the past to 
review administrative acts, while diminishing their deference to the supposed administrative 
expertness. Id. at II. (Emphasis added.) 
The shift took place as administrative action became concerned with individual rights, 
i.e., the "security," deportation, passport cases, etc., as differentiated from the earlier gen-
eral economic questions. Id. at 19 et seq. Professor Gellhorn notes that in consequence 
"within this brief span of [25] years the defenders and detractors of the administrative 
process have all but exchanged roles." Id. at 4. l\fany "who a few years ago discovered the 
agencies as vehicles of social reconstruction now regard them as positive impediments." 
Jaffe, Review of Davis Administrative Law Treatise, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1638 (1960) (herein-
after cited Jaffe on Davis). 
And there are tried "liberals" who now prefer judges to administrators, GELLHORN, 
supra at 22; Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An 
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436, 473-74 (1954). 
11 Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1273. See also address, James M. Landis, "The 
Administrative Process -The Third Decade," before ABA, Section of Administrative Law, 
Aug. 29, 1960, Washington, D.C., p. 5 
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Having garbed those who are "re-examining" the administra-
tive process with the robes of the "New Criticism," Mr. Kintner 
wraps himself in the mantle of "pragmatism," as opposed to the 
"rigid conceptualism" on which "the proposal for an administra-
tive court is bottomed."12 But what is "pragmatism" to one may 
appear like an "abstraction" to another: the Kintnerian School op-
poses "to the 'abstraction' of separation of powers ... what is itself 
an abstraction ... that policy making and adjudication are indis-
solubly married. "13 Because the union of prosecution and ad-
judication was once experimental-and therefore "pragmatic," it 
does not follow that it is not now equally pragmatic to inquire 
whether the experiment "works," the touchstone of "pragmatism." 
Otherwise, "pragmatism" would be exhausted by its first exercise, 
mistaken though it was, and the "radical experiments of yesterday 
[would] become frozen into a new conservatism."14 
It bears emphasizing that there is nothing sacrosanct about the 
union of prosecuting and adjudicatory functions in one agency. 
The union was not received on Mount Sinai; it is merely an ex-
periment in government, and a comparatively recent departure at 
that. Professor Jaffe reminds us that while the ICC had been given 
power to adjudicate, initiation of prosecutions was ordinarily left 
to private parties, and the emphasis was "less an attempt to fix 
blame, than it was legislative," i.e., rule-making. The "more 
obvious breach with the tradition [ of separating adjudication from 
prosecution] came with the Federal Trade Commission which was 
authorized to initiate and try charges of unfair practices and other 
violations of law .... "15 The combination of those functions, says 
Professor Jaffe, is "a rather novel element of our administrative 
law. It seems to have grown up without too much thought and 
without sufficient awareness of its break with tradition."16 When 
12 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 967, 965, 968. 
13 Jaffe on Davis, supra note 10, at 1689. 
14 Hector, The Regulatory Agencies and the Pragmatic Approach, Sterling Lecture, 
Yale Law School, April 19, 1960, p. 4, a delightful critique of the pre-emption by regulators 
of the "pragmatic" approach. "It was the greatest of conservative writers [Edmund Burke] 
who wrote: 'Nothing in progression can rest on its original plan. We may as well think of 
rocking a grown man in the cradle of an infant." " BROGAN, THE PRICE OF REvoLUTION 267 
(1951). 
15 Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1279. 
16 Id. at 1284. (Emphasis added.) 
"Viewed in retrospect, even the Interstate Commerce Commission for all its lauded 
precedent value was little more than a specialized court until the Transportation Act of 
1920. It was concerned almost entirely with problems of discrimination and prejudice in 
tariffs, and acted largely at the instigation of shippers. Its discretionary area of policy• 
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the Attorney General's Committee came to study this union in 
1940, it "suggested devices for mitigating its dangers,"17 chief of 
which was an internal separation of functions. But, said that 
committee, "Such internal separation by no means eliminates the 
problem of combination of functions; but it alters, or if wisely 
done may alter, its entire set and cast."18 Our starting point, 
therefore, is a "rather novel" combination of prosecuting and ad-
judicating functions, which despite all efforts to "mitigate its 
dangers" remains the "most acute problem of our administrative 
system." A proposed solution of this problem deserves to be con-
sidered in an atmosphere at once free from invective19 and from 
unreasoning worship of the status quo. 
Being no less than Mr. Kintner a child of our "pragmatic" era, 
I propose to inquire how the combination "works," to prefer 
making or rule-making was really very little more than that of a body such as the Tax 
Court today. After the railroads were returned to private ownership and the 1920 Act 
was passed, the ICC spent most of its energies trying to save and restore an industry in 
serious trouble rather than in curbing the forces of private acquisitiveness in the public 
interest. It was a rescue, welfare operation more than it was a regulatory operation. 
"The Federal Trade Commission has a similar history. The product of Wilsonian 
democracy, it had scarcely got under way before the first World War temporarily over-
shadowed its work. During the 20s it accomplished little, and certainly did nothing to draw 
on itself any massive, all-out attack from private business. 
"So it was that despite all of this purported long history of independent regulatory 
agencies, the real battle over them was postponed until the New Deal and the 1930s. This, 
of course, when it came, was a battle over economic issues fought in Constitutional terms. 
It was really the New Deal that was at stake, not the institution of the independent regula-
tory agency." Hector, The Regulatory Agencies and the Pragmatic Approach, Sterling 
Lecture, Yale Law School, April 19, 1960, pp. 5-7. 
17 Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1280. 
18 REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMI'ITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 55 (1941). 
Judge Friendly recently said, "I trust no one is so naive as to think the separation of 
functions decreed by the Administrative Procedure Act really works." A Look at the 
Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429, 438 (1960). 
19 It is strange that Mr. Kintner should accuse the ABA of an undercover assault on 
the substantive scheme of regulation at the very time that the "new commission," installed 
by President Eisenhower, for which Mr. Kintner has been an eloquent apologist [Kintner, 
The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 
114~ (1955) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Revitalized FTC)], has been charged in important 
quarters with subverting the legislation confided to it for administration. Mr. Kintner 
records (at 1143) that "Representative Wright Patman, redoubtable author of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, is 'terribly disturbed and greatly disappointed' with the 'new look' of the 
Commission," and that the Commission is accused of being "at the forefront of 'subversive' 
assaults on the Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at 1145. Also, that Senator Kefauver "is fearful 
that the Commission is pursuing an ominous course 'which casts a threatening shadow over 
the entire structure of the antitrust laws,' " and that "other members of Congress have 
similar doubts." Id. at 1143-44. To be sure, Mr. Kintner has demonstrated to his own 
satisfaction that such doubts are ill founded. But at least one unbiased observer, Professor 
Jaffe, has said, "Recent appointees to the Trade Commission ••• appear to feel that they 
have a mandate to pursue a more conservative course and to revise somewhat agency doc-
trine." Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1288. (Emphasis added.) 
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"practical considerations" to "neat theorems,"20 and, so far as 
possible, to eschew "abstractions," if only because unthinking re-
petition has made some virtually impervious to the most hallowed 
generalization.21 Mr. Kintner's numerous criticisms afford con-
venient pegs for discussion. 
No Man Should Be Judge in His Own Cause 
Lowell Mason, for eleven years a commissioner of the FTC, 
states generally of administrative proceedings: "the men who sit 
in judgment on you will be the men who originally complained 
against you."22 There is no need to expatiate at this late date upon 
the value of the long-established principle that "No man should 
be judge in his own cause."23 To some extent, the Board of Tax 
Appeals, predecessor of the respected Tax Court, was "established 
entirely outside the Treasury Department" to meet the demand 
for "review by an impartia1 outside body."24 The success of both 
the Board and Tax Court alone should absolve the ABA of making 
an "untested utopian" proposal25 for the divorce of adjudication 
from prosecution. 
Mr. Kintner has no quarrel with the merits of the "slogan," "no 
man should be a judge in his mm cause,"26 but concludes that "the 
idea has no practical application to the Federal Trade Commission. 
The five Commissioners derive no personal profit from proceed-
ings before them."27 But, as the Lord Sankey Committee stated, 
"bias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy may 
operate as a more serious disqualification than pecuniary inter-
est. "28 On the other hand, there are those who believe, as Prof es-
20 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 965. 
21 We need to be reminded that a generalization such as "separation of powers is an 
:accumulation of wisdom generalizing a corpus of down-to-earth e.xperiences." Jaffe on 
Davis, supra note 10, at 1639. 
22 MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 303 (1959). 
23 For an excellent discussion of this principle and of separation of power considera-
·tions, see Clark, The Judicial Functions of the Federal Trade Commission Should Be Trans-
ferred to the District Courts, Proceedings, Antitrust Section, ABA, April 4, 1957, p. 51 
(hereinafter cited Clark, Transfer of Functions). 
24 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 241, 
:247. For a similar recent report respecting a Court of Veterans Appeals, see supra note 5. 
25 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2 at 968. 
26 How easily a cherished tenet is transformed into a "slogan" or mere catchword. 
27 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81. 
28 REPORT OF THE CoMMITIEE ON MINISTER'S POWERS 78 (1932); see also infra, p. 228. 
·Professor Cooper recently stated that "administrators, appointed to administer broad 
policies of social or economic reform, entertain so strong a predilection for rapid imple-
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sor Davis testified, that "the same agency which determines policy 
for particular subject matter through rule making, supervising, 
and prosecuting, and otherwise, should also adjudicate the cases 
that arise out of the application of that policy."29 "Judges," Pro-
fessor Davis goes on to say, "are characteristically relatively neutral; 
in fact, sometimes they are regarded as having biases which favor 
the protection of previously existing property rights, as against the 
furtherance of legislative or social objectives."30 "Unlike a judge 
... an administrator often has an affirmative program to carry out; 
he often has a mission, a purpose, a policy."31 Here we come to 
grips with a major argument for administrative adjudication, 
rooted in a belief that administrators are instruments of "social 
and economic progressivism" and can be "relied upon for wise and 
just decisions."32 
Now I am heartily for "social and economic progressivism" and 
I entertain no doubt that in large part administrators are high-
minded. But my doubts whether we can lodge such great power 
in administrators, virtually unreviewable power33 to do what they 
genuinely believe is for our own good, were stirred when Bertram 
Wolfe demonstrated that Lenin was entirely highminded in con-
cluding long before the Revolution that the ignorant, downtrodden 
Russian people could be rescued only by dedicated shock troops 
who would unquestioningly adhere to a "party line."34 There is 
mcntation of these policies, that they exhibit an active interest in the outcome of cases 
pending before them •••• " 
"Their constant striving to reach desired results tends to make most administrators 
'convicting judges.' " The Executive Department of Government and the Rule of Law, 
Address Before University of Michigan Summer School for Practicing Lawyers, Ann Arbor, 
Mich., June 23, 1960, pp. 6, 9-10. [This address will appear in a forthcoming issue of the 
Michigan Law Review.-Ed.] 
29 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 14. See also Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and 
Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1955). 
30 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 15. 
31 Id. at 14. 
32 Note 10 supra. 
33 For inadequacy of judicial review, seep. 218 infra. 
84 WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE THE REvOLUTION (1948); SHUB, LENIN (1948). Professor 
Brogan said: "A patriotic Chinese, faced with the poverty of that country, with what may 
be its increasing poverty and seeing no way out except a rapid increase in industrialization 
and a rapid increase in the output of the land, may conclude, in no selfish or vulgar inten-
tion, that only a vigorous, rigorous, modem power in China can do both and provide the 
necessary political authority without which the best schemes of industrial technicians and 
agronomists will come to nothing. And to that end, he may put up with a great deal of 
mendacity, a great deal of intellectual isolation and coercion, even with the shedding of a 
great deal of blood. He may be willing to pay the price of revolution.'' BROGAN, THE PRICE 
OF REVOLUTION 259 (1951). 
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no need to dwell on the lamentable fruits of that policy or to equate 
administrative adjudication with Stalinistic suppression of all 
political rights. But to lodge virtually unreviewable discretion in 
administrators to act for what they conceive to be our good may 
well seem an unnecessary step in that direction. From Lenin we 
can deduce that an Orwellian Big Brother who "knows best" is 
not for us, that administrative powers can and should be tested by 
impersonal tribunals. Agency adjudication was provided for 
those instances in which a person claims that the facts do not come 
within the agency rule or policy or that the policy or rule do not 
come within the statute. On such issues, a litigant is entitled to a 
judgment "unbiased" by a "mission or purpose." 
Let it be admitted that from time to time courts, too, have 
been swayed by their biases against socio-economic legislation. 
One need only recall judicial opposition to minimum wage and 
hour legislation.35 But the cure is not to substitute a legislative 
or administrative bias for a judicial one. Rather it is to inculcate 
in lawyers and judges a consciousness that adjudication requires 
a never-ending alertness against identifying personal predilections 
with the requirements of law. 
Does the Separation of Functions Really Insulate? 
Mr. Kintner would dismiss such considerations on the ground 
that the Commission does not "exercise at one and the same time 
the roles of prosecutor and judge" because "All investigational 
work is handled by a separate bureau of investigation within the 
Commission," and "upon completion of the investigation, if it 
appears that complaint is warranted, the results of the investiga-
tion are referred to another separate bureau within the Commis-
sion, the Bureau of Litigation, which prepares a complaint ... " if 
it concludes that to be in the public interest. When "the com-
plaint has been drafted it is referred to the Commission." In 
"looking at a complaint and directing its issuance the Commission 
is merely signifying its belief that a probability of violation exists 
85 Courts are now "more conscious of current economic and social trends than they 
were two decades ago." Davison, An Administrative Court of the United States, 24 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 613, 617 (1956). Recently, Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Southern 
District of New York referred to certain cases which were removed from the courts "at a 
time when people were worried about the conservatism of the Court-a complaint which 
isn't heard too often these days .•.• " Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace 
With Modern Court-Developed Techniques Against Delay'I-A. Judge's View, 12 AJ:,. L. Buu.. 
103, 104 (1960). 
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... ," a procedure whch Mr. Kintner assimilates to a ruling on a 
demurrer or grant of certiorari.36 From this recital one infers that 
the Commission first learns of a complaint after submission by the 
Bureau of Litigation and that approval is more or less formal. On 
paper this seems like an aseptic procedure, conducive to truly 
judicial detachment. The need for insulation is real, for, as 
former Chairman Hmvrey found, "if I delved into the investigative 
file and made a personal study of the facts and the law that formed 
the basis of the complaint, I ran the danger of prejudging the 
matter."37 
There is reason to believe that Mr. Kintner, and at least one 
other commissioner, Mr. Secrest, have not been equally alive to the 
"danger," and that they cannot in fact divorce themselves from 
what the prosecutor-investigators are doing. Speaking with ref-
erence to "payola" practices in the radio-television industry on 
March 9, 1960, Mr. Kintner stated, "Our investigational files in 
the 60 cases where complaints have been issued or approved reveal 
that payments have been made by manufacturers or distributors 
to 255 disc jockeys or other employees of broadcast licensees .... " 
(Emphasis added.) He tells us on the same occasion, apparently 
on the basis of a "preliminary investigation to determine the 
method and extent" of an activity designated as "plugola," that "in 
soliciting clients for hidden plugs, one such firm has assured its 
prospective clients that the hidden commercials would consist of" 
five described items, and describes the "cost of these hidden com-
mercials" and by whom they are "planted."38 Details of eight 
complaints against food chains are found in his speech of October 
19, 1959;39 and he improved the occasion by describing a hypo-
thetical case of "advertising allowances" which could "turn out to 
86 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 78-79. 
37 Howrey, The Federal Trade Commission -Present Problems and Suggested Changes, 
Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, April 4, 1957, p. 40 at 47 (hereinafter cited 
Howrey, Fed. Trade Comm.) Mr. Howrey continues to be troubled by the problem. Id. 
at 107. 
88 Address, The Federal Trade Commission Today, before the Federal Bar Association, 
Philadelphia Chapter, pp. 2 and 7. 
39 Legal Obligations and Moral Responsibility of Powerful Food Buyers, before Nat'l 
Ass'n of Food Chains, Washington, D.C., p. 6: "These 8 complaints contain allegations of 
inducing discriminatory advertising allowances, illegal receipt of brokerage, illegal coercion 
and price fixing, and mergers which may lessen competition .••• " 
See also a large group of complaint letters quoted in Mr. Kintner's The Public Re-
ports, Remarks at Chicago to Alpha Delta Sigma, Professional Advertising Fraternity, 
November 24, 1959, which Mr. Kintner referred to the Bureau of Investigation, p. 4. See 
also Statement, "Resurgens: The Federal Trade Commission in 1959," N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 
-Antitrust Law Symposium -1960, p. 30 (hereinafter cited Kintner, Resurgens). 
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have been highly unprofitable when the balance sheet includes the 
cost of litigation,''40 a cheerful enough prediction from a prosecu-
tor, but quaere whether it would be made by a judge. 
Commissioner Robert T. Secrest, referring on June 1, 1960, 
to a "factual record" developed in the Commission's insurance 
investigation, detailed many disparities between the advertising 
claims of the companies and the actual facts. For example, he 
mentions a "typical claim" that the company would pay "up to 
$15 a day for 100 hospital days ... for each sickness or accident" 
and comments: "There were in fact many cases of accident or 
sickness for which policies so represented did not provide pay-
ment. "41 From an investigator or prosecutor, this is quite ap-
propriate, but does it not sound a note of "prejudgment" in the 
mouth of a "judge?" Against this background, Commissioner 
Secrest' s statement on the same occasion that "the vote of the 
Commission in issuing the 41 complaints ... was unanimous"42 
suggests something more than pro forma approval of complaints. 
Mr. Kintner tells us that the "Commission's principal role 
[i.e., its enforcement program] ... is as wielder of the big stick."43 
And he takes pride in the performance of that role, stating that in 
the first nine months of fiscal 1960 "the Commission issued 85 
antimonopoly complaints. This was 5 more than the number is-
sued during the entire 1959 fiscal year.''44 On June 3, 1960, Mr. 
Kintner stated that the Commission filed 17 Clayton Act com-
plaints during a certain period and that "Of these 17 cases, 9 have 
already resulted in cease and desist orders,"45 an excellent batting 
average, of which a prosecutor might well be proud. But would 
a "judge" boast of a prosecutor's high conviction rate? 
Consider, too, the singular identity between remarks by the 
Associate Director of the Bureau of Litigation and a subsequent 
speech by Mr. Kintner. On April 4, 1960, the former, addressing 
the dairy industry, said: 
40 Speech of Oct. 19, 1959, supra note 39, at 7. 
41 Statement before the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, San Fran-
cisco, p. 3. (Emphasis added.) 
42ld. at 5. 
43 Statement, The Current State of Advertising, Los Angeles Breakfast Club, Los 
Angeles, June 15, 1960, p. 10. 
44 Statement, One Goal Is Service, before National Independent Dairies Ass'n, '\V'ash-
ington, D.C., April 4, 1960, p. 4 (Mr. Kintner's emphasis). 
45 Statement, Some Suggestions for Compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, before 
Carolinas-Virginia Purchasing Ag~nts Ass'n, N.C., p. 10. 
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"If there are those in your industry who take comfort in the 
listing of these cases [ a roster of complaints filed against in-
dustry members] and believe that the trade regulation laws 
are concerned only with the competitive behavior of giant 
concerns, a somber note of warning was sounded by the is-
suance of an FTC complaint six weeks ago against what must 
be a relatively small dairy .... "46 
On April 22, 1960, Mr. Kintner sounded the same "somber note 
of warning" in virtually identical terms.47 Would a judge regard 
the "issuance of a complaint" as a "somber note of warning?" 
This "warning" was not adventitious, for Mr. Kintner states 
that the Commission is "fired by a determination" to achieve "the 
ideal of free and fair competition," and that "The Commission's 
powers of investigation and subpoena are indispensable weapons 
in the battle for an economy based upon free and fair competition. 
The Commission serves warning that it will strenuously resist any 
effort to diminish the effectiveness of these weapons, and it pledges 
that they will never rust from lack of use."48 He stated that "The 
Federal Trade Commission quite honestly wishes to be a menace 
to predators of the market place .... "49 Would a judge brandish 
the "weapons" of the Commission at a business community which 
must contest before him whether those weapons were properly 
employed? And will not one who constantly evangelizes about 
the enforcement duties of the Commission be hard put to main-
tain an open mind for the re-examination and re-interpretation 
of the basic law which it administers? Every lawyer knows how 
hard it is to discard a conviction and start afresh; only the in-
escapable exigencies of government should place the process of 
adjudication under that handicap.50 Louis Hector has graphically 
-46 Statement by William R. Tincher, The Federal Trade Commission and the Dairy 
Industry, before National Independent Dairies Ass'n, Washington, D.C., p. 10. 
47 Statement, The Federal Trade Commission and the Food Industry, before the 
American Dry Milk Institute, Chicago, pp. 4-5. 
Consider too Mr. Kintner's Statement, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, before 
Sixth Annual Institute of Management for Appliance-TV Dealers, ·washington, D.C., Au-
gust 8, 1960, p. 5: "\\Te are, however, determined to prevent misuse of bargain advertising 
through every means at our disposal - education [ etc.] .•• But when these means do not 
work, our Bureaus of Investigation and Litigation are called upon for more convincing 
action." (Emphasis added.) 
-48 Kintner, Resurgens, supra note 39, at 32, 46. (Emphasis added.) 
-40 Statement, Government and Trade Association Executives Have a Joint Responsibil-
ity for Compliance with the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Laws, before New York Society 
of Association Executives, New York, N.Y., June 16, 1960, p. 4. (Emphasis added.) 
60 When a prior investigation of the "basing point system" resulted in charges that 
the Commission had prejudged the issues, the Supreme Court, faced by the painful fact 
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illustrated the difficulty a .Board member has, when he dons his 
judicial cap, in dismissing from his mind relevant matters which 
he learned in his administrative-legislative capacity.111 Moreover, 
anyone who has served in government knows that "separation" 
operates as a permeable membrane rather than an air-tight parti-
tion, and that important staff views have a way of filtering through 
as if by osmosis.62 How often we have heard new appointees com-
plain that they are prisoners of the staff. 
An illustration of the strains to which the fusion of functions 
subjects the FTC's adjudicatory impartiality is furnished by the 
Carnation case. Defendants, in return for a stipulation that they 
might produce certain types of transactions by totals, agreed not 
to challenge Commission counsel's amendment of the complaint 
after the hearing began. Having amended and thus profited by 
the stipulation, Commission counsel sought to repudiate it and to 
obtain detailed evidence. The Examiner rejected the repudiation 
but was reversed by the Commission. Though recognizing that 
stipulations "should not be entered into lightly and when entered 
should be observed to the letter," the Commission nevertheless 
concluded that the stipulation should be set aside because it placed 
"an undue restriction on the obtaining of information which other-
wise may be necessary to establish the case of counsel supporting 
the complaints and to that extent it is contrary to the public in-
terest."112• Observe the facile identification of the prosecution's 
that if the Commission were disqualified the "complaint could not have been acted upon 
by the Commission or by any other government agency" could yet offer only the scant 
comfort that "the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of 
its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were 
irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point practices." Federal Trade 
Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
Contrast this with the judicial standard: "Every litigant is entitled to nothing less 
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, who must possess the disinterestedness of a 
total stranger to the interests of the parties ...• " Barnard v. Judge of Superior Court, 191 
Mich. 567, 574 (1916), quoting Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 54 (1912). 
111 For two years the CAB had been urging carriers to introduce new low promotional 
fares in order to build up traffic and had discussed various plans. Suppose, says Mr. Hector, 
that one of the carriers files a new low promotional tariff and that two other carriers file 
a protest. How, asks he, can the Board forget its talks as policy makers and become judges 
looking only to the record, particularly when still talking to the same carriers on other 
tariffs still in the planning stage. To discontinue such talks is to make policy in a 
vacuum. He concludes that such conversations "undoubtedly influence adjudication" be• 
cause the facts and impressions gained thereby simply cannot be forgotten. Hector, Memo-
randum, supra note 4, at 954-55. 
62 See note 18 supra. 
62• In the Matter of Carnation Co., Docket No. 6172-79, March 14, 1956. Trade Reg. 
Rep. (1956) ,i26,021. (Emphasis added.) 
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case with the public interest. District attorneys also represent the 
public interest in prosecuting law violators, but what court would 
out of hand release them from their stipulations solely because 
they could thereby better present their case?53 Dissenting, Com-
missioner Lowell Mason justly stated that this repudiation "places 
us in a partisan role at variance with our judicial protestations."114 
The foregoing facts, to my mind, seriously impeach the claim 
that the "separation of functions" is "sufficient safeguard" against 
the "danger" presented by the union of adjudication and prosecu-
tion;1515 they remove criticism of this union from the realm of "ab-
straction" and suggest rather that it is sheer web-spinning to pre-
mise that incompatible functions lodged in one and the same man 
can be "separated" by a paper separation. 
No Need To Lose Expertise 
Pointing to Supreme Court reliance on agency expertise and 
the Hoover Task Forces' recognition of the FTC's "special com-
petence," Mr. Kintner concludes that "such special competence 
largely would be lost" through transfer of its judicial functions.116 
The benefits attributed to administrative "expertise" have too 
158 Ordinarily stipulations are binding and will be set aside only upon proof of mistake, 
fraud, overreaching or oppressive hardship. 7 CYc. FED. PRO. 454-55 (2d ed. 1943). So, 
the Commission was permitted to set a stipulation aside entered under "mistake of fact." 
P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1950). But Lorillard, upon which 
Carnation relies, does not support the proposition that anything which facilitates presen-
tation of the prosecution's case authorizes repudiation of a stipulation. 
15i Reprinted in MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 77, 80 (1959). Commissioner Mason 
reminds us that "welshing is dirty business" in any context. Id. at 79. Mr. Kintner points 
out that in 1956 the Commission dismissed 32% of the cases which came before it. Kintner, 
Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443. 'Without examination of the cases the per-
centage is meaningless. Possibly there was so little evidence as to show plainly that the 
cases never should have been brought, and possibly adequate screening by the Commission 
itself would siphon off such prosecutions. Again, the errors may have been so glaring as 
to invite reversals by the courts of appeals if left uncorrected by the Commission. 
155 Mr. Kintner has uneasily alluded to the apparent "inconsistency in having investi-
gative functions lodged with the group that also adjudicates," but concluded "if sufficient 
safeguards are thrown about the adjudicative process that it will work ••.• " Harris Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 46·47. See note 18 supra. 
156 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 494. Former Chairman Howrey 
said, "as my friends on the Commission would be the first to admit, the courts' deference 
to the Commission has been somewhat misleading. Many of the references to the expert-
ness of the Commission, upon closer examination, are found to be mere restatements of 
legislative intent rather than expressions of confidence. And more than one judge has 
gone out of his way to criticize the Commission." Howrey, Fed. Trade Comm., supra note 
37, at 42. 
Indeed, Mr. Kintner himself tells us that the Supreme Court "has too often found the 
need to overrule the Commission's specialized judgment." Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra 
note 19, at 1146. 
212 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
long rested on unquestioned assumptions.57 Mr. Kintner himself 
quite recently, answering the question "can we truthfully say that 
those who bear the responsibility of decision truly possess it [ ex-
pertise] in the expected measure," states that "the obvious and 
sorrowful answer must be 'no.' "57a The mine-run agency ap-
pointee is not an expert and generally does not stay long enough 
at his post to become an expert. When Mr. Kintner points to the 
fact that Commissioner Kern and himself were promoted from the 
staff, 58 he overlooks that such promotions are the exception, that 
the lion's share of administrative appointments go to outsiders 
without the slightest claim to expertise. Mr. James M. Landis tells 
us that when he became Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board 
he had "little knowledge of the subject."59 And as Landis points 
out, rotation in office of agency members is "only too common,''00 
and in consequence "that the type of expertise resulting from ex-
perience is not developed ... .''60a Mr. Kintner himself has recorded 
the displacement of three incumbent commissioners, Carson, Spin-
garn and Carretta, by the Eisenhower Administration at the FTC;61 
two others, Mead and Mason, have since been displaced-a com-
plete housecleaning. Former SEC Commissioner McConnaughey 
reminds us that in its twenty-five years of existence the SEC "has 
had maybe 15 Chairmen,"62 and the bulk of its commissioners, my 
own study revealed, served one, two and three years. Such rapid 
turnover, justly stated Louis Hector, has made "almost meaning-
less the 'expertise' which agency members are supposed to develop 
in long terms of service.''63 By excluding himself, Mr. Kintner is 
able to arrive at an average service of four years of the incumbent 
FTC commissioners.64 I daresay that the average incumbent dis-
trict judge in the District of Columbia or on the Tax Court has 
been sitting about fifteen years. Is it not reasonable to assume, 
with lifetime tenure for judges of a Trade Court, that the judges 
57 We "should be examining the truth of certain legends • • • built up about the 
administrative process .... The first of these is the legend of its possession of expertise." 
Landis, supra note 11, at 6. Note the reference by Professor Gellhorn, supra note 10 to 
"supposed administrative expertness." 
57• Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law, supra note 1, at 6. 
58 Kintner, The Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at !Yl7. 
59 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 112. 
60 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 96. 
60• Landis, supra note 11, at 9. 
61 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at 1147. 
62 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 126. 
63 Supra note 51, at 957. 
64 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at !Yl7. 
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will have an opportunity to develop the expertise which thus far 
has merely been an administrative mirage? 
If the agency member is not an expert, at least, it is argued, he 
can be advised by specialists. So, Mr. Kintner stresses that "At the 
FTC our devoted staff has acquired several thousand man-years of 
experience, which is constantly available to the commissioners."65 
Experience has shown, says Professor Davis, that "controversies 
involving, say, questions of law, accounting, and engineering, may 
best be decided by an agency which is advised by lawyers and ac-
countants and engineers."66 The Commission itself excludes those 
engaged in performing investigative or prosecuting functions in 
any adjudicative proceeding from advising the Commission ex 
parte therein.67 The reason for such exclusion, said the Attorney 
General's 1941 Report, is that "A man who has buried himself in 
one side of an issue is disabled from bringing to its decision that 
dispassionate judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands 
of officials who decide questions." Continues the report, "the view 
of the investigators and advocates [should] be presented only in 
open hearing where they can be known and met by those who may 
be adversely affected by them."68 Precisely the same considerations 
should govern all members of the investigating and prosecuting 
staffs and of staff experts as well. One who has worked for an 
agency knows that there is a "party line" in such matters. A par-
ticular suit is one of a series that may be in preparation by other staff 
members who vibrate sympathetically. Technical and unifying 
legal theories are constantly under discussion with fellow staff 
members. And the staff "experts" are by no means free of evange-
listic zeal; often they trigger prosecutions. Generally speaking, 
"experts" tend to be "biased" for the party who calls them,69 and 
there is no reason to conclude that government experts are im-
mune. To the contrary, their bias may be intensified because 
they are constantly immersed in a stream of "mission or purpose." 
Then, too, experts are not infallible; the books are full of instances 
in which experts have been tripped on faulty premises or untenable 
inferences. Speaking of expert inferences "drawn from an exten-
sive scrutiny of uncontradicted 'background' data ... procured by 
65 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
oo Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 15. 
67 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81. 
68 REPORT OF ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COM!IUTIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 56 (1941). 
60 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 646-7 (3d ed. 1940); cf. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 69 
(1942). 
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staff experts and made part of the record," Judge Jerome Frank 
stated: "In all candor, it must be noted that, even as to such facts, 
there may be legitimate differences of opinion. For so-called 'eco-
nomic data' are, often not 'data' (i.e., given) but involve interpre-
tations; and there may legitimately be differing expert interpreta-
tions. "70 While, therefore, expert assistance is of great value in 
enabling an agency to prepare and prosecute a case, expert aid to 
adjudicators must in the interest of justice be subject to correction 
by cross-examination lest error be sealed in. Such factors pre-
sumably led Professor Davis, whose "careful scholarship and 
academic detachment" were recently lauded by Mr. Kintner,71 to 
state: 
"[T]here is danger in consultation by the agency heads with 
the staff specialists behind the scenes, when ideas or informa-
tion are brought into a case without giving representatives of 
the parties sufficient opportunity to know what it is, and op-
portunity to meet it. I think there is great danger." 
The "cure," he said, is to 
"require that the significant factual material that is used for 
decision shall be placed on the record or otherwise made 
known to the parties so that there will be an adequate op-
portunity to rebut or to explain or to cross-examine, as the 
case may be."72 
Fair play demands no less. But if expert testimony is to be placed 
on record, the expertise argument goes down the drain, for the 
agency tribunal will then enjoy no advantage over a court. Courts, 
too, can hear experts, and judges who remain on the bench, as for 
example on the Tax Court, will understand this record testimony 
far better than the fleeting agency appointee. And a concomitant 
and by no means inconsiderable advantage will flow from removal 
of the agency's adjudicatory function: instead of being insulated 
from its experts, the Commission will then be enabled to work 
closely with them in the formulation of enforcement programs and 
the initiation and prosecution of cases with the object of spreading 
the results before the Trade Court. Moreover, as Professor Jaffe 
recently remarked,72• a separate adjudicatory organ 
'10 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 69, at 122. 
71 Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 630. 
72 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 26. 
72• Jaffe on Davis, supra note 10, at 1641. 
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"may have its own specialists and it may learn a great deal 
from a specialized administrative and enforcement agency 
appearing before it. In some situations, indeed, the values of 
specialization may in this way be more effectively realized. 
There will be less hostility to free exchange between the ad-
judicators and their staff when their role is limited to ad-
judication." 
Individual Opinion Writing and Institutional Decisions 
The controversy over institutional decisions-opinions written 
by an anonymous opinion-writing staff-was stirred afresh by Louis 
Hector's candid report to the President respecting Civil Aero-
nautics Board practices.73 Professor Davis, a proponent of agency 
adjudication, earlier noted that "the agency heads may in fact lean 
so heavily on the work of the staff as to know little or nothing of the 
problems involved in many of the cases decided in the agency's 
name."74 And he more recently stated, "The weaknesses of the in-
stitutional decision lie in its anonymity, in its reliance on extra-
record advice, in frustration of parties' desire to reach the men who 
influence the decision behind the scenes, and in the separation of 
the deciding function from the writing of the opinion or report."7is 
To this may be added a breakdown of the case-to-case policy-making 
which was deemed an important attribute of agency adjudication.76 
Hector discloses an agency failure to engage in such policy-making, 
one of the reasons being that the agency members merely vote on 
the outcome of a case and the opinion justifying the outcome is 
written by the staff. The staff "consciously avoid statements of 
general principle" so as to "be able to write an opinion justifying 
an opposite conclusion the next day.''77 Lest this be deemed an 
isolated practice, Hector cites the statement of the FCC Chairman 
that "there is nothing, especially in the FCC ... that you can ... 
73 Hector, Memorandum, supra note 4. Decisions are written by an opinion-writing 
staff after the Board makes its decision. Id. at 947. The Board does not tell the writers 
in detail what to put in the opinion. Ibid. Seldom do the published opinions deviate from 
the drafts submitted and in one case the Board was urged to release a 71-page opinion 
which had just reached it the day before. Id. at 947-48. In no case did the opinion-writers 
come back and tell the Board that the facts do not square with the decision. Id. at 948. 
Since the Board does not read the record, id. at 946, it must be endowed with a power of 
factual divination that surpasses the wildest feats claimed for extra-sensory perception. 
74 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 330 (1951). 
71S 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 37 (1958), although he regards the institu-
tional decision as "inevitable," infra, p. 216. 
7G SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
77 Hector, Memorandum, supra note 4, at 942-43. 
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rely on."78 In a word, the commissioners, acting judicially, says 
Hector, "seldom enunciate policy."79 
Striking confirmation for this view was recently furnished by 
ICC Commissioner Webb: 
"If, as I believe, the Commission's voice is too often uncer-
tain, it is because an anonymous professional staff of opinion 
writers cannot reasonably be expected to articulate vital prin-
ciples when they receive little or no guidance from individual 
Commissioners .... Today, and for some years past, members 
of the Commission have been unable to assume any large 
measure of responsibility for the writing of important Com-
mission opinions."80 
Dissatisfaction with "the institutional approach to the decision of 
cases which tends to substitute bureaucratic red tape for the per-
sonal participation of NLRB members" was recently noted by the 
Cox Advisory Panel.81 
Indeed, Professor Davis states that "the objection to the sep-
aration of deciding from opinion writing may be unanswerable 
except in terms of inevitability,"82 the "inevitability" arising from 
the sheer volume of work in some agencies. But, as Professor 
Jaffe observes, "the inevitability is a consequence of the choice to 
load up the 'members' of the agency with ultimate responsibility 
for a great variety of tasks .... The vice of the argument, if any, 
proceeds from the . . . assumption that all the related tasks in an 
area, e.g. 'policy making' and adjudication, must be under a com-
mon direction."83 
78 Id. at 942 n. 31, quoting 11 An. L. BULL. 137 (1958). 
79 Id. at 946. Landis states that opinion-writing by an anonymous staff has "resulted 
in the lack of development of adequate standards in various administrative fields." Landis, 
supra note 11, at 7. 
80 Address, The Voice of the Interstate Commerce Commission, before the Richmond 
Chapter of the ICC Practitioners Ass'n, Richmond, Va., May 5, 1960, p. 2. Commissioner 
Webb goes on to state: "the report writer knows that the best way to guard against re• 
writing a draft report is to avoid an extended discussion of controversial issues of trans• 
portation policy and clear-cut findings on hotly contested issues of fact . • • the report 
writer, having little or no guidance from any Commissioner, is quite naturally disposed to 
write an ad hoc opinion having a minimum of value as a precedent." Id. at 4. 
81 REPORT TO THE SENATE LABOR COMMITI'EE BY ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR•MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS LAw, Professor Archibald Cox, chairman, Organization 8: Procedure of NLRB, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 1960), Doc. No. 81, p. 2. It recommended "less reliance upon 
legal assistants, elimination of the internal procedures by which legal assistants of the 
several members confer upon, and virtually determine, the Board's decision .••• " (p. 7). 
And it concluded, "Members should give personal attention to, and have personal respon• 
sibility for, all the decisions in which they participate." (p. 6). 
82 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90 (1958). Commissioner Webb, supra note 
80, at 2, states that "the institutional decision is presently a matter of stark necessity." 
83 Jaffe on Davis, supra note IO, at 1641. 
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Anticipating objections to "institutional decision" ·writing, Mr. 
Kintner emphasizes that the FTC commissioners explain their 
votes in individually prepared opinions, that they "do not merely 
rubber stamp the work of an anonymous professional staff of 
opinion ·writers. "84 Professor Davis is of the view that such opinion 
"t\TI"iting by agency members is too burdensome to be feasible.811 
That view has considerable force. In the 1958-1959 fiscal year, 
the FTC issued 355 opinions,86 or 71 opinions per commissioner. 
Consider the manifold additional duties of the Commission: the 
work of the Trade Conferences,87 the Commission's coordination 
of investigation and litigation programs,88 its masterminding of 
improvements in administration,89 to which may be added the 
necessity of testifying before congressional investigating and 
budgetary committees, the submission of investigatory reports to 
Congress,00 the promulgation of rules and regulations, and, last 
but not least, the amount of time spent by commissioners on the 
necessary task of educating American business. This last was in-
tended to be one of its most important functions,91 and Mr. Kintner 
has energetically addressed himself thereto. It is reported that 
"during his term [one year] as Chairman, Kintner has made 160 
speeches, appeared 300 times on TV programs, and held nearly 
300 press conferences."91 • When, one wonders, can Mr. Kintner -
let alone the mine-run commissioner who does not rejoice in his 
extraordinary energy - find time to study the massive records of 
Commission proceedings, to read voluminous briefs, do necessary 
legal research and prepare his own 71 opinions, let alone prepare 
84. Kinter, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 972. He recently stated that "many voices 
have been raised in opposition to the institutional decision. To these I add my own." 
Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law, supra note I, at 6. It is widely believed that the Commission's 
"Division of Special Legal Assistants" writes the majority opinions for the commissioners. 
85 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90 (1958). 
86 Commissioner "\Vebb, supra note 80, at 3. 
87 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 971. 
88 Kintner, Resurgens, supra note 39, passim. 
80 E.g., the new Robinson-Patman Task Forces treated by the Commission for better 
enforcement of that act, id. at 3-4. See also Kintner, Statement, A Challenge to the Food 
Industry, before Grocery Manufacturers of America, New York, N.Y., Nov. 9, 1959, pp. 19-20. 
90 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 974. See also Kintner, Statement, Legal 
Obligations and Moral Responsibility of Powerful Food Buyers, before Nat'! Ass'n of Food 
Chains, Washington, D.C., Oct. 19, 1959, pp. 2-3. 
91 Mr. Kintner agteed that the FTC "was designed to be an educational body for 
businessmen •.•• " Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C., April 
4-5, 1957, p. 113. See also Kintner, Statement, Responsibilities of Government and Business 
in Our Free Market Economy, before Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., May 
17, 1960, pp. 3-4. 
01• 106 CoNG. REc. 15605 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1960) reprinting an article published in 
the Daily News, Aug. 15, 1960. 
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himself intelligently to assay the remaining 284 drafted by his 
fellow commissioners? 
Judicial Review of FTC Orders Is Inadequate Substitute 
for Trade Court Initial Adjudication 
Deficiencies in administrative adjudication, Mr. Kintner inti-
mates, are curable on judicial review. For cease-and-desist orders 
"are not self-executing," and a respondent "gets court review of 
the Commission's determinations of law, and the facts of viola-
tion .... "92 But the facts underlying the order are virtually im-
pregnable to attack, because "the courts are largely bound in [re-
view] proceedings by administrative determinations of fact, which 
are thus similarly conclusive upon the respondents."93 We need 
to remember, as Judge Jerome Frank emphasized, that" 'the facts,' 
when there is a clash of testimony, are in truth nothing but a sub-
jective reaction of the judge or jury [ or Commission] to the testi-
mony ... [their] guess as to [the conduct of the parties],"04 and 
that the "heart of the fact finding process often is the drawing of 
inferences from the evidence."95 Since, where the facts are the 
"prime factor in arriving at a decision the trial judge . . . often 
has a discretion ... which is beyond control,"96 and since "the 
scope of review of administrative findings is narrower than the 
scope of review of a judge's findings,"97 well may the administrator 
say, "Let me but find the facts and I care not who writes the laws." 
So long as administrative disinterestedness is suspect, judicial re-
view of virtually unreviewable fact findings can be no adequate 
substitute for initially dispassionate adjudication. 
Will a Trade Court Impair Present Powers of Settlement? 
To take away the adjudicatory power, Mr. Kintner states, 
"would destroy, in great part, the effectiveness of other techniques 
by which the Commission achieves compliance with the trade regu-
92 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443-44. 
93 Fuchs, The Hoover Commission Report, supra note 29, at 20. (Emphasis added.) 
94 FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 74-75 (1942). Judge Frank cites an SEC opinion which 
refers to the "inescapable subjective factors in the minds of those who pass judgment and 
is therefore not safeguarded against error." Id. at 121. 
95 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 137 (1958). Former Commissioner Lowell 
Mason found that in the administrative scales "one feather of government inference is 
worth a ton of a private citizen's facts." THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 303 (1959). 
96 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 94, at 92. 
97 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 95, at 121. 
1960] TRADE COURT: A REPLY TO MR. KINTNER 219 
lation laws without resort to formal proceedings."98 More specifi-
cally, he says, "the existence of the power to issue cease-and-desist 
orders assists the Commission in securing the closing of cases by 
voluntary00 compliance after investigation, by stipulations, and by 
consent orders after a complaint is issued."100 "Consent orders" 
could, of course, be processed as well after filing of a complaint in 
the Trade Court, and, as Herbert Clark states, the mere "decision 
by the Federal Trade Commission to take the matter to court would 
in many cases lead to a consent order."101 The Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice gets a substantial number of consent 
decrees without having the adjudicatory power. There must in 
consequence be some magic in the mere "existence" of the FTC 
adjudicatory power, presumably the confidence of the Commis-
sion's prosecutors - and the correlative fear of respondents - that 
the Commission is more apt to s,ving the "Big Stick"102 - issue a 
cease-and-desist order - than is an "unbiased" court. Mr. Kintner 
quotes the Attorney General's Committee Report, 1941, that "ami-
cable disposition of cases is far less likely where ... the prosecuting 
officials cannot turn to the deciding branch to discover the law and 
the applicable policies."103 If the "separation" of which Mr. Kint-
ner boasts is meaningful, neither the investigating nor prosecuting 
officials should discuss a particular case with the Commission which 
it may later be called upon to judge. In truth, the trade court pro-
posals, by releasing the Commission from its adjudicatory task, 
would really make it available for staff discussion of "law and 
applicable policies," uninhibited by embarrassing considerations of 
"separation of functions." 
No Transfer of Legislative Power 
Mr. Kintner argues that in proposing to transfer the function 
of deciding whether to issue "cease-and-desist" orders "the leaders 
llS Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 631; Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, 
mG~9~ . 
llO The moderator of a discussion before the ABA Antitrust Section, Robert w·. Austin, 
in which Mr. Kintner was stressing "the purely voluntary aspect of a stipulation" said, "I 
remember stipulations offered to me, already written, and with no negotiations and being 
told I took either the stipulation or the complaint." Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law, Washington, D.C., April 4-5, 1957, p. 113. 
100 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 976. See also Freer, The Case Against the 
Trade Regulation Section of the Proposed Administrative Court, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
6!17, 647-48 (1956); Nutting, The Administrative Court, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1384, 1387 (1955). 
101 Clark, Transfer of Functions, supra note 23, at 57. 
102 See note 4!1 supra. 
103 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 90. 
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of the American Bar Association are promoting the transfer to a 
constitutional court of functions which are primarily legisla-
tive ... .''104 For this he cites no less an authority than the ABA 
itself in a 1936 report,105 saying that "obviously, if the 1936 Special 
Committee was right the 1956 Special Committee is wrong."106 
The ABA, of course, is not infallible, and it would not be remark-
able to find a group of lawyers differing with their predecessors 
after the lapse of twenty years. Have we not the august example 
of the Supreme Court? But the fact is that in 1936 the ABA Com-
mittee, like its 1956 successor, said, "Cease and desist orders are 
nothing more nor less than injunctions in effect ... .''107 This is 
the view of the courts,108 and it follows logically from the fact that 
an injunction is a court order requiring a person to do or refrain 
from doing a particular thing.109 Mr. Kintner himself states that 
cease-and-desist orders "look like injunctions .... "110 Such orders, 
of course, are judicial, not legislative. How can orders entered in 
adversary proceedings wherein the parties assert conflicting claims 
and the tribunal inquires whether past actions violate existing law 
be anything but judicial? 
Mr. Kintner informs us, however, that "The Supreme Court 
supports the 1936 Committee: 'In administering the provisions of 
the statute in respect of 'unfair methods of competition' - that is 
to say in filling in and administering the details embodied in that 
general standard - the Commission acts in part quasi-legislatively 
and in part quasi-judicially,'" quoting Humphrey's Executor v. 
104 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 80. 
105 Id. at 77, citing Report of the ABA Special Committee on Administrative Law 238 
(1936). 
106 Ibid. 
101 Report, supra note 105, at 238. With respect to the jurisdiction "to prescribe rates, 
classification practices and regulations, for the future," the 1936 Report went on to say 
that the "exercise of such a function has usually been regarded by the courts as a legis-
lative act .•.• The committee believes that even eventually it will not be desirable to lodge 
the original exercise of most of these functions in the Court, both for practical reasons and 
because the functions approach so closely to the legislative field." Ibid. 
If the general reference is somewhat ambiguous, is it yet fair to deduce that the 1936 
'Report concluded that an injunction is legislative, like prescribing "rates • • . for the 
future?" 
10s "[A] cease and desist order is of the nature of an injunction." NLRB v. Tehel 
"Bottling Co., 129 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 
1939). See also Fuchs, supra note 29, at 20. 
109 Consolidated Coal &: Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 Fed. 934, 935 (S.D. Ohio 1922); Gainsburg 
-v. Dodge, 193 Ark. 473, 476 (1937); Railroad Commission of Texas v. McDonald Motor 
·Freight Lines, 127 S.W .2d 932, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). 
110 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443 n.23, quoting, "The cease and 
-desist order is in effect, an administrative injunction." Harris, The Hoover Commission 
.Report: Improvement of Legal Services and Procedure, 41 A.B.A.J. 713, 716 (1955). 
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United States.111 That case in no way involved the nature of the 
Commission's power to apply a statute to a particular case - a 
familiar judicial function - but the power of the President to re-
move a member of an independent agency without qualification. 
Its reference to the two means of "filling in" may be regarded as 
convenient shorthand for the legislative rule-making and the 
judicial "cease-and-desist" processes of administering the "unfair 
competition" provision. We should not attribute to a casual, not 
really relevant, dictum an intention to obliterate the carefully 
drawn, long-established line between judicial and legislative action. 
Mr. Kintner also suggests that to the extent that the proposed 
transfer "includes the Commission's authority to define 'unfair 
methods of competition' . . . this might be an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch .... "112 Since 
the ABA proposal is confined to transfer of the adjudicatory power, 
it does not comprehend the truly legislative rule-making power. 
By power to "define," Mr. Kintner must necessarily mean, there-
fore, the adjudicatory power to "interpret" the statutory terms. 
This is an everyday judicial function. Mr. Kintner himself quotes 
a Supreme Court statement that "this general language [ of the 
relevant Clayton Act] was deliberately left to the 'Commission 
and the courts' for definition . ... "113 For years the courts have 
been "filling in" and "defining" the details of the Sherman Act 
"restraints of trade." The fact, therefore, that, in Mr. Kintner's 
words, "Each time that the Commission issues an order to cease 
and desist . . . it is filling in the meaning of the statute . . . , "114 
does not convert that judicial act into a legislative one. For, as he 
said elsewhere, the "ultimate application" of the FTC act is "to 
be arrived at 'by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and 
exclusion.' "1111 
Miscellaneous 
I. No Need To Discard Precedents. Mr. Kintner tells us, that 
"the forty-five years of precedent contained in the Federal Trade 
Commission Reports furnishes a valuable exposition of policy," a 
111295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). Kintner, Trade Court and A.BA, sup,,-a note 2, at 77. 
112 Kintner, Tmde Court Proposal, sup,,-a note 2, at 444. 
113 Kintner, Trade Court and A.BA, supra note 2, at 87, quoting FTC v. Cement 
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
114 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, sup,,-a note 2, at 444. 
1111 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, sup,,-a note 19, at 1190. 
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"body of precedent [which] should not be discarded lightly.''116 
But in a more revealing moment, Mr. Kintner disclosed that 
"Traditionally, Commission findings were couched in for-
malistic terms often a mere parroting of the language of the 
complaint, without narrative statement of any kind or any in-
sight into the ratiocination of the decision. Gerard Hender-
son, in 1924, termed the decisions 'masterpieces of ambiguity.' 
In 1941, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
Procedure considered Commission decisions 'of indifferent 
value as precedents.' ... Professor Davis, as recently as 1951, 
agreed that the Commission 'has been glaringly deficient in its 
failure to prepare reasoned opinions.' 
"The courts, too, have regularly upbraided the Commis-
sion for the quality of its decisions.''117 
But the " 'new' Commission," installed by the Eisenhower admin-
istration, "now issues an opinion in every case," a practice inaugu-
rated during the past five years.118 This scarcely adds up to a 
"valuable exposition of policy" contained in "forty-five years of 
precedent." And in view of the "great weight" attached by the 
courts to administrative interpretation,119 who is to say that a trade 
court will "lightly discard" its administrative predecessor's "valu-
able precedents?" 
2. The Commerce Court. "Many years ago," states Mr. Kint-
ner, "in response to pressure by the American Bar Association, 
Congress created a specialized commerce court which was abolished 
after three years because of its poor performance record .... De-
spite the specialization, the commerce court was found to be ·wrong 
with respect to 10 of its 12 decisions which were reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.''120 Thus specialization, which is repeatedly ex-
tolled as a virtue in agencies, unaccountably results in "poor per-
formance" when acquired by a court. In fact, however, the Com-
merce Court "was born in a political storm, almost at once became 
the object of political attack ... [ and] under a new administration 
was choked to death. . . .''121 From the death of the Commerce 
116 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 971. 
117 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at 1151-52. 
118 Ibid., Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 127. 
119 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940). 
120 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 94. 
121 Rightmire, Special Federal Courts, 13 ILL. L. REv. 97 (1918). Nor is the transfer 
of the power to review administrative adjudications from the courts of appeals to the 
commerce court an apt analogy for the transfer of power to make administrative adjudica-
tions to a Trade Court. Many who esteem specialization at the trial level believe that the 
advantage lies with broad, overall experience on review. 
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Court in the heat of political battle,122 it cannot be concluded that 
a specialized court is synonymous with "poor performance." 
3. Waiting for Administrative Self-Improvement. Repeatedly 
Mr. Kintner stresses that the administrative process can be im-
proved - apparently by the agencies - and that it "should not be 
abandoned for an untested utopian alternative ... " until such im-
provement is demonstrably ineffective.123 Presumably it is not 
unfair to evaluate the possibility of future self-improvement by 
past performance. On this score I cannot improve on Mr. Kintner's 
o·wn statements: 
"Commission sluggishness has been repeatedly scored in the 
past. A 1946 Congressional inquiry uncovered startling 
evidence of delay in the processing of cases. In some cases as 
many as 8 years elapsed before completion .... A 1951 House 
Report found that 'an inordinate amount of time has been 
devoted to just plain "sleeping on a case." ' 
"Perhaps most glaring of the Commission's past infirmities 
has been its compliance program. . .. A 1946 Congressional 
inquiry reported with some astonishment that the Commis-
sion had no 'systematic follow-up' of Commission orders ... 
to determine whether or not the orders actually [Mr. Kintner's 
italics] were being obeyed. . . . In 1951 a House group re-
ported: 'In spite of the interest recently displayed by the Com-
mission in enforcing its orders, its compliance program is still 
very weak.' "124 
122 Professors Frankfurter and Landis tell us that President Taft urged creation of a 
commerce court for reasons analogous to "those which induced Congress to create the 
Court of Customs Appeals" [THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 156 (1928)], that the 
proposal at once "drew the fire of the then 'insurgent' group in the Senate" [id. at 157], 
11upported by the Democrats [id. at 158-59], and that "the gravaman of their objection 
furnishes the keynote of the opposition during the debate of the following 5 months and 
forecasts the fate of the court. It was feared that the bent of mind and the environment 
of the judges selected for such a court would incline them towards the railroads and against 
the public interest, in the dramatic conflict of 'public' against 'railroads,' in terms of 
which the problem of railroad control was conceived.'' Id. at 157. 
In a word, the Commerce Court "entered an environment partial to the [Interstate 
Commerce] Commission and distrustful of courts .••• [T]he Court, heedless of the public 
temper, promptly began to reverse the Commission and to curb its activity. • . . [T]he 
Commerce Court was itself promptly reversed and curbed by the Supreme Court.'' Id. at 
165. The Commerce Court, "itself thus furnished apparent vindication of the foreboding 
prophecies of those who had bitterly contested its creation. The movement for its abolition, 
which was promptly under way, thus assumed the character of a revolt against the Admin-
istration ..• .'' Id. at 166. When " .•. Democracy came to power on March 4, 1913, the 
Court's doom was sealed.'' Id. at 171. 
123 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 968. 
124 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at ll48, ll50. 
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Mr. Kintner's candid acknowledgment of his predecessors' sins is 
but a prelude to his recital of changes wrought by the "new" 
dispensation in 1953. 
But we also have some "sleeping" on the part of the "New 
Commission" which we are entitled to consider in evaluating a 
plea for the chance to benefit by self-improvement. The Commis-
sion, Mr. Kintner tells us, is "engaged in a continuous search for 
methods that may be of use in eliminating delay."126 In April 
1957, former Chairman Howrey, addressing the meeting before 
which Mr. Kintner launched his attack on the ABA Trade Court 
proposals, said that "In some respects FTC procedures are still in 
the 'horse and buggy' stage as compared 1vith federal court proce-
dures," that "Because of the lack of such modem techniques as 
pretrial discovery . . . the trial of the so-called 'big case' before a 
hearing examiner is bound to be more cumbersome and dravm out 
than similar trials before a court," and that "It is high time . . . 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [which contain "ex-
tremely liberal provisions for discovery"] be followed in FTC ad-
versary hearings."126 It is "high time," indeed, for the Federal 
Rules have been in effect since 1938. A similar call was issued on 
May 7, 1959, by Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.127 In a sym-
posium before the ABA Section of Administrative Law which met 
in Miami Beach, Florida, in August 1959, I outlined a statutory 
scaffolding which would support administrative regulations mak-
ing discovery available, pointing out that the FTC already enjoyed 
the advantage of one-sided discovery through its investigation and 
subpoena procedures. Not'\vithstanding that, Mr. Kintner, in the 
same issue of the Administrative Law Bulletin which printed that 
outline,128 stated that "if improvement in administrative process 
is necessary and can be supplied from within, . . . we should look 
upon it as compulsory [Mr. Kintner's italics] from within rather 
than voluntary,"129 discovery is yet to be made available by the 
FTC. If a lag between 1951 and 1953 entitled the "New Commis-
125 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 973. 
126 Howry, Fed. Trade Comm., supra note 37, at 44-45. (Emphasis added.) 
121 Address, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court-developed 
Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, before the Federal Trade Examiners Con-
ference, Silver Spring, Maryland, reprinted 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1960). Judge Kaufman 
quotes (id. at 115) 1 DAv1s, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 589 (1958): "Probably no sound 
reason can be given for failure to extend to administrative adjudication the discovery pro-
cedures worked out for judicial proceedings.'' 
12s Berger, "Discovery in Administrative Proceedings," 12 AD. L. BULL. 28 (1959). 
129 12 AD. L. BULL. 3 (1959). 
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sion" to claim credit for the cure is it not equally to blame for 
failing still to act on ex-Chairman Howrey's call in 1957? This 
history, to my mind, suggests the wisdom of preferring a legislative 
transfer of judicial functions to waiting on possible administrative 
self-improvement,130 particularly in an area where by the nature 
of the problem self-improvement is virtually impossible. 
4. Why Single Out the FTC. Why, asks Mr. Kintner, single 
out the FTC, the agency which has gone so far to achieve an in-
ternal separation of functions.131 The answer lies in the nature of 
its functions. The Attorney General's Committee stated in 1941: 
"There are ... some agencies such as the Federal Trade 
Commission and the National Labor Relations Board whose 
principal duty is the enforcement, by decision of cases, of cer-
tain statutory prohibitions. In the case of such agencies, the 
practical objection ... to isolating the adjudicatory function 
and handing it over to some independent body would not 
exist to the same extent .... And it is undoubtedly true that 
agencies whose only substantial task is that of enforcing the 
prohibitions of a statute through adjudication, especially in 
such controversial fields as that of unfair methods of business 
competition and labor relations, are peculiarly in danger of 
being charged with bias by those against whom the prohibi-
tions are sought to be enforced. "132 
The Commission's "principal role in policymaking is performed 
by applying broad statutes to individual cases,"133 a typical judicial 
function, expressed in characteristic judicial form by issuance of 
the injunction-like "cease-and-desist" order. It is therefore a logi-
cal candidate for primacy in separating adjudication from prose-
cution. 
The reasons advanced by the Attorney General's Committee 
in 1941 against separating FTC prosecution from adjudication 
deserve re-examination. First is the "danger of friction and of a 
break-down of responsibility as between the two complementary 
agencies."184 The answer of the minority, Messrs. McFarland,. 
130 Mr. Kintner testified in 1958 that "not enough has been done by the Government 
agencies towards implementing the excellent recommendations ••• of the President's Con-
ference on Administrative Procedure of 1953 and 1954." Harris Hearings, supra note 2~ 
at 44. 
131 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 90, 81. 
182 REPORT OF TIIE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 58-
(1941). (Emphasis added.) 
lSS Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 975, 970. 
lM REPORT OF ATIORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMrrn:E ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 58, 
(1941). 
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Stason and Vanderbilt, has gained force with the years; there is a 
separation in administration of the Sherman Act, the tax system, 
and customs law135 without a "breakdown." A second reason, the 
alleged harm to "informal settlements," has earlier been discussed. 
Then, too, it was asserted that interpretations of vague statutes 
should "not have to be evolved by a series of litigations."136 Yet 
this, Mr. Kintner claims, remains- after 46 years- the principal 
task of the Commission.137 These alleged evils which would flow 
from a separation of adjudication from prosecution are, to my 
mi~d, as nothing compared to those that obtain under the present 
union. 
To suggest that the transfer of this one adjudicatory function 
will "destroy" the FTC138 is to indulge in hyperbole. There will 
remain, first, its rule-making power, whereby it can maintain its 
grip on "policy" making.139 Rules have the force of law if within 
the statute and in cases of doubt carry great weight as administra-
tive interpretations. Second, the Commission will be freed for the 
task of vigorous investigation and enforcement; and the possibility 
of overlooking important enforcement problems, as in the case of 
the recent deceptive television "quiz programs,"140 will be dimin-
ished. Third, it will be freer to undertake economic surveys and 
to educate the American businessman, tasks that were originally 
deemed of utmost importance.141 Fourth, it can devote more time 
to developing the usefulness of its trade conferences. Fifth, it can 
make more meaningful recommendations for legislation to the 
Congress. And last, it can take a much more vital role in the selec-
135Id. at 206-07. 
136 Id. at 59. 
137 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 970-71. 
138 Note 6 supra. 
139 Sellers, The Administrative Court Proposal - or Should Judicial Functions of Ad-
ministrative Agencies Be Transferred to an Administrative Court, 23 D.C. B.A.J. 703, 708 
(1956). Compare the effect given by the courts to regulations of the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
140 The House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight recently reported that it "cannot 
Tefrain from noting the opportunity which the FTC had in this [an early FTC] investiga-
tion to expose the whole sordid hoax of the rigged television quiz shows" (p. 27), and that 
in its opinion the FTC "had ample authority to proceed against the marketing and use of 
rigged television quiz show programs as a deceptive business practice within the meaning 
-of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." H.R. REP. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Feb. 9, 1960, p. 29. See also ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON DECEP• 
TIVE PRACTICES IN BROADCASTING MEDIA, Dec. 30, 1959, pp. 4-5, 14-15, 37-42. Note too that "A 
Senate Banking sub-committee has discovered that the Federal Trade Commission is not 
policing widespread use of 'deceptive and misleading' advertising of credit terms on instal-
ment sales. . • • The FTC has ample power to regulate such 'misleading' advertising of 
-credit terms." Washington Daily News, April 25, 1960, p. 26. 
141 See note 91 supra. 
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tion, preparation and prosecution of cases, thereby exerting a pow-
erful influence on their decision by the Trade Court and on the 
continuity of its "policy." Thus, far from being "destroyed" by 
the removal of one function - adjudication, the Commission will 
be better able to perform all of its remaining and important 
functions. 
Mr. Kintner challenges us to point out "real, not imagined, 
-defects in the functioning of the administrative agencies as they are 
now constituted."142 It is not easy to get behind the scenes for a 
glimpse of how administrative adjudication "really" functions. We 
are indebted to Louis Hector for one such glimpse.143 Proceeding 
without the benefit of a similar glimpse at the "dark side" of the 
FTC moon,144 it is yet a "real defect" that Mr. Kintner should be 
under the need of brandishing the "weapons" of the Commission 
before the business community as a prelude to adjudicating whether 
those "weapons" were properly employed.145 It is a defect that 
there remains grave doubt whether the "separation of functions" 
really insures dispassionate adjudication, that the FTC should too 
easily identify the case for the prosecution, as in Carnation, with 
the "public interest." It is a defect that charges should continue 
to be aired that administrative tribunals hear ex parte representa-
tions respecting pending adjudicatory matters and that Congress-
men, Senators and others seek to influence such adjudication. 
Would a court "be free of the defects?" asks Mr. Kintner.146 
What Congressman in his senses would dare to call a judge with 
the object of influencing his decision? The impartiality of a court 
would be unclouded by charges that its mind was "irrevocably 
closed" by virtue of investigatory reports submitted by it to Con-
gress.146• No court would be under the necessity of evangelizing with 
respect to enforcement programs that would come before it for 
adjudication. It would not be under suspicion of being unduly 
influenced by vigorous prosecuting and investigation divisions, or 
for releasing the prosecution from a stipulation merely to advance 
its cause. These may not constitute "real defects" in the eyes of Mr. 
Kintner, but they are "real" enough to those who seek fair play 
before administrative tribunals. 
142 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 968-69. 
143 See note 51 supra. 
144 Cf. Beelar, The Dark Side of Agency Litigation, 12 AD. L. BULL. 34 (1959). 
145 Supra, p. 209. 
146 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 969. 
146• See note 50 supra. 
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Conclusion 
Confidence in the "unbiased" judgment of our adjudicatory 
tribunals is an indispensable bastion of our form of government.147 
Chairman Leedom of the NLRB recently stated that "courts do 
have a public respect that agencies lack and must acquire.''148 If 
the FTC has been unable in 46 years to win such confidence, we 
may justifiably ask, why not. And the answer may in great part 
lie in the fact that the FTC is trying to accomplish divergent, basi-
cally incompatible tasks, tasks which no amount of paper "separa-
tion" can reconcile, and which should be once more divorced if 
only to preserve confidence in our adjudicatory processes. 
In truth, it is idle to expect impartiality of an agency that is 
directed to effectuate a policy. If genuine impartiality is desired, 
adjudication must then be placed outside the agency, for agency 
adjudication can offer no more than the semblance of impartiality. 
This is the nub of the Sir Oliver Franks' Committee's recent report 
to Parliament: 
"[W]hen Parliament sets up a tribunal to decide cases, the ad-
judication is placed outside the Department concerned. The 
members of the tribunal are neutral and impartial in relation 
to the policy of the Minister, except insofar as that policy is 
contained in the rules which the tribunal has been set up to 
apply. But the minister, deciding in the cases [left to him to 
decide], is committed to a policy which he has been charged 
by Parliament to carry out. In this sense he is not, and cannot 
be, impartial.''149 
Whether certain exigencies may require agency adjudication of 
policy at all costs may be left for future examination. The Trade 
Court proposal is aimed at the situation where a prosecutor charges 
law violation which he is now required to judge, the classic situa-
tion for impartial adjudication. 
147 "In this country government rests fundamentally upon the consent of the gov-
erned. The general acceptability of these adjudications is one of the vital elements in 
sustaining that consent." REPORT OF THE [Sir Oliver Franks] COMMITI'EE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE TRIBUNAIS AND ENQUIRIES 5 (1957). Quoted in Veterans Affairs Report, supra note 5, 
at 5. 
148 Speech, December 13, 1957. Attorney General Rogers recently said, "There should 
be in every instance the same public confidence in the integrity and fairness of administra-
tive proceedings as court proceedings now enjoy," implying that agencies do not now 
enjoy such confidence. Supra note I. 
149 Supra note 147, at 5. The Lord Sankey Committee said, "It is unfair to impose 
on a practical administrator the duty of adjudicating in any matter in which it could be 
fairly argued that his impartiality would be in inverse ratio to his strength and ability 
as a Minister." Supra note 28, at 78, 
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The Trade Court bill is a modest, empirical approach to what, 
despite the "separation of functions," remains an "acute problem." 
It singles out an unquestionably judicial function, determination 
in an adversary proceeding whether there has been violation of an 
existing law, culminating in issuance of a cease-and-desist order 
which is like an injunction in nature and a familiar staple of the 
courts. It does not represent a sharp breach with a long-established 
tradition but rather a return thereto after an experimental, un-
studied and comparatively recent departure. If the Trade Court 
proves meritorious, we can profit by its example; if it fails, it can 
be abandoned. It "is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system," said Justice Brandeis, that a "single courageous State" may 
try "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country."150 Bearing in mind also the successful example 
of the Tax Court and the Customs Court, it cannot be that the 
return of adjudicatory functions from one federal agency or two 
to an administrative court would "scuttle the entire administrative 
process." 
1110 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion, Stone, 
J., concurring). 
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Judge Friendly's recent article, "A Look at the Federal Admin-
istrative Agencies, "151 came to my attention as my o·wn was in 
galley, too late to incorporate comment thereon in the body. Al-
though he modestly points out that he is a "new judge," speaking 
from the "vantage point of six months,"152 his standing as a veteran 
practitioner before CAB lends special weight to his views. 
Judge Friendly fears that the proposal to separate the adjudi-
catory from the policy-making function "would destroy what is 
one of the greatest merits of the administrative agency, its combi-
nation of legislative, executive, and judicial attributes."153 By way 
of illustration, Judge Friendly says it "would deprive the public 
of the benefits of the very expertise that is a principal raison d'etre 
of the regulatory agency."154 Students of the administrative process 
increasingly view this "expertise" as a delusion;155 and administra-
tive courts can become at least as expert as administrators, witness 
the Tax Court. Aware of the increasing premature rotation of 
agency members, Judge Friendly suggests that their terms be 
lengthened to ten years.156 Even if the lengthened term should for-
tify agency members against the siren calls of business or private 
practice, it will yet not remove the competing administrative pres-
sures arising from a multiplicity of duties which constrain agency 
members to rely on institutional decisions, a prime source of dis-
satisfaction with agency adjudication.157 It will not insulate ad-
judication from the incompatible prosecuting function,158 nor will 
it erase from the minds of the administrative adjudicators the 
policy that they pressed upon an industry before they sat in judg-
ment on a dissenter from that policy.159 And it will not satisfac-
torily insulate the agency members from external pressures. 
Judge Friendly's second objection to an administrative court 
is that the "line between policy making and adjudication is al-
together too shadowy to afford a basis for separation."160 If this 
151 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429 (1960). 
152Id. at 429. 
153 Id. at 441 
154 Id. at 442; and seep. 443. 
155 Supra, p. 211. 
156 Supra note 151, at 445. 
157 Supra, p. 215. 
158 Supra, pp. 206-11. 
159 Supra note 51. 
160 Supra note 151, at 441. 
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means that policy making is not for courts, there are many areas 
in which they make policy; for example, they have been making 
policy within the vague confines of the antitrust laws for sixty 
years. Indeed there are those who prefer that "judges rather than 
commissioners should shape the large outlines of our economic 
policy, where Congress has not stated its will."161 The joint ad-
ministration of the Sherman Act by the courts and the Depart-
ment of Justice, and of the tax laws by the Tax Court and the 
Internal Revenue Service, indicate that administrative policy mak-
ing is not hamstrung by judicial participation. If policy making 
by administrators is to be preferred because it is they who are 
responsible for carrying out the entire "program," I suggest that 
it is precisely this identification with the "program" which renders 
impartial administrative adjudication difficult, if not virtually im-
possible.1 62 
Moreover, Hector has given evidence of a break-down of ad-
judicatory policy-making, which is not confined to CAB.163 If we 
free the commissioners from an uncongenial, burdensome, and 
inadequately performed judicial task, they can the better concen-
trate upon their legislative task - the formulation of policy. The 
agency can then retain control over policy through the formulation 
of rules164 which, if within the statutory authorization, are binding 
upon the court. And the administrative court can undertake the 
case-to-case formulation of policy that is now neglected. 
I would not suggest that the problem of separating the adjudi-
catory function from the other administrative functions in rate-
making cases is of the same order as the simpler FTC issuance of 
a complaint that the law is being violated. But even though, as 
Judge Friendly states, the "fixing of future rates is surely not a 
'judicial' function,''165 for which reason it may not be confided to 
a "constitutional," Article III court, it does not follow that such 
functions cannot be assigned to a "legislative" court. The Tax 
Court furnishes an example of one such court; the Court of Claims 
101 Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdi-
cation of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436, 473 (1954). 
102 Supra, pp. 204-06, 228. 
103 Supra, pp. 215-16. 
164Supra, p. 226. If NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter, 270 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1959} 
intimates, with respect to union-operated hiring halls, that this is "the type of thing that 
agencies with expert knowledge ought to do," as Judge Friendly states, supra note 151, at 
442, it is worth noting that the same 9th Circuit later suggested that the APA rule-making 
procedures would have been better suited to the problem than adjudication. NLRB v. 
E 8: B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1960). 
105 Supra note 151, at 442. 
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and Courts of Customs began as "legislative" courts. The object 
of the separation, as in the case of the Tax Court, would be to secure 
impartial adjudication, although I am not without further study 
prepared to say that such separation in rate-making cases is either 
necessary or desirable. 
Finally, Judge Friendly, in connection with "unfair labor prac-
tices" adverts to the possibility that an administrative court would 
impose "ineffective remedies [which] could effectively frustrate 
policy, whereas by imposing penalties out of relation to the crime 
it might build up resentments which would lead to a demand for 
legislative change that a more expert administrator would have 
avoided."166 Courts employ a very wide discretion in formulating 
antitrust decrees,167 and such decrees have yet to breed the "re-
sentment" which led to abridgment of the powers of those "expert 
administrators," the NLRB, by the Taft-Hartley laws and the in-
stitution of a separate office of General Counsel. 
166Jd. at 443. 
167 Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952). Professor Op-
penheim states: "The difficulties of formulating an effective decree in complex anti-trust 
cases often involving the complex structure of the entire industry are obviously enormous." 
OPPENHEIM, CAsES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRusr LA.ws 886 (1948). 
